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Abstract
In the absence of a successful international cooperative agreement over the control of
emissions there is a growing interest in the role that clean technologies may play to
alleviate the climate change problem. Within a non-cooperative transboundary pollution
game, we investigate, analytically and within a numerical example based on empirical
evidence, the impact of the adoption of a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the
emission to output ratio). We show that countries may respond by increasing their
emissions resulting in an increase in the stock of pollution that may be detrimental
to welfare. This possibility is shown to arise for a signi￿cant and empirically relevant
range of parameters. It is when the damage and/or the initial stock of pollution are
relatively large and when the natural rate of decay of pollution is relatively small that
the perverse e⁄ect of clean technologies is strongest. Cooperation over the control of
emissions is necessary to ensure that the development of cleaner technologies does not
exacerbate the free riding behavior that is at the origin of the climate change problem.
JEL classi￿cations: Q20, Q54, Q55, Q58, C73.
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11 Introduction
We investigate whether the development and/or transfer of clean technologies can allevi-
ate the consequences of failing to reach a global international agreement over greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions1.
Recently governments, international organizations and academics have turned their
attention towards the creation and sharing of clean technologies as a possible alternative
means of alleviating climate change. In the United States (US), this has taken the form
of new legislation. The ￿Investments for Manufacturing Progress and Clean Technology
(IMPACT) Act of 2009,￿has been introduced to facilitate the development of domestic
clean energy manufacturing and production2. International organizations, such as the
United Nations (UN), are also actively encouraging countries to fund the development
of clean technologies. In 2009, the UN Environmental Program urged countries to al-
locate one third of the $2.5 trillion planned stimulus package (spent by the developed
world to boost the economy under the ￿nancial crisis) for investing on ￿ greening￿the
world economy. The G8 summit held in July 2009 included a commitment by the mem-
bers to double public investment in the research and development of climate-friendly
technologies by 2015.
A second related consensus among policy makers is the need to facilitate technol-
ogy transfer from developed to developing countries. This transfer of technologies has
emerged as a promising solution to deal with the asymmetric abilities of di⁄erent coun-
tries to undertake these costs. On September 26, 2008, leading industrialized nations
(including the United States, Britain and Japan) pledged more than US$6.1 billion to
the Climate Investment Funds, a pair of international investment instruments designed
1Large polluters, such as the US, remained outside the Kyoto Protocol. Others that rati￿ed the
Kyoto Protocol seem unable or unwilling to reach the targets they committed to. At the G8 summit
held in July 2009, for example, there was widespread disappointment at the failure of countries to agree
upon how they intended to achieve the emission targets (The Economist, July 10, 2009). More recent
disappointment followed at the UN Climate Conference (COP15) held in Copenhagen in December
2009 which failed to set targets for emissions or to provide a mandate for a legally binding treaty (The
Economist, December 19, 2009).
2The IMPACT Act will set up a two-year, $30 billion manufacturing revolving loan fund for small-
and medium-sized manufacturers to expand production of clean energy products. It was integrated into
the Waxman-Markey Act (also known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act) passed by the
US House of Representatives in June 2009.
2by the World Bank to provide interim, scaled-up funding to help developing countries
in their e⁄orts to mitigate increases in greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate
change (World Bank Press Release No:2009/092/SDN). In addition, developed countries
have promised to contribute funds to assist technology transfer to developing countries3.
Developing countries such as India and China have demanded technology transfers (as is
evident from the negotiations held at Copenhagen), and international agreements such
as the Asia-Paci￿c Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2006) have been
signed. Partner countries of the Asia-Paci￿c Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate (Australia, Canada, India, Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States)
agreed to cooperate on development and transfer of technology which enables reduc-
tion of Green House Gas (GHG) emissions.4 At the UN Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen in December 2009, it was agreed that $30 billion should be provided in the
short run for funding projects in developing countries and a long term system should be
set up whereby $100 billion is provided per annum from 2020 onwards (The Economist,
19 December 2009).
There is also increasing support in the academic literature for the view that inno-
vative technology will play a central role to resolve the climate change predicament.
Barrett (2009), argues that to stablize carbon concentration at levels that are compati-
ble with a long-run goal of an increase of the earth￿ s temperature by 2￿C with respect to
the pre-industrial era will require a ￿ technological revolution￿ . Galiana and Green (2009)
similarly predict that reducing carbon emissions will require an energy-technology rev-
olution and a global technology race5.
3For example, a bill was introduced in the US to set up the International Clean Technology Deploy-
ment Fund which would aid developing countries by promoting international deployment of US clean
energy technology (US Fed News, 16 July 2008). The US president launched the Major Economies Fo-
rum (MEF) in March 2009, to initiate a dialogue among developed and emerging economies to combat
climate change and promote clean energy (for further details, see the White House Fact Sheet on Clean
Energy Technology Announcements (14 December 2009)).
4For further details, refer to http://www.asiapaci￿cpartnership.org/english/default.aspx
5Barrett (2006) argues that even treaties on the development of breakthrough technologies will
typically share the same fate as treaties on emissions control since, unless technological breakthroughs
exhibit increasing returns to scale, these treaties will fail because of the incentive of countries to free
ride. However Hoel and Zeeuw (2009) show that this pessimistic outcome can be overturned if one takes
into account that the adoption costs of a breakthough technology vary with the level of R&D. They
show that a large coalition can be both stable and result in a signi￿cant welfare improvement.
3We investigate, analytically and through a numerical example using empirical evi-
dence, the impact of adopting cleaner technologies within a framework that considers
transboundary pollution emissions and where pollution emissions accumulate into a stock
and therefore have lasting repercussions on the environment, two essential features of
the GHG emissions￿problem. Consider a world made of n countries or regions, we deter-
mine the non-cooperative emissions policies of each region and determine the impact of
having all countries simultaneously adopt a cleaner technology (captured by a decrease
in their emission to output ratio). Although we cover in detail the case of identical
countries, our analysis allows the discussion of the case of asymmetric regions that di⁄er
with respect to their emissions per output ratio and where a ￿ clean￿technology is being
transferred to the regions that are using a ￿ dirty￿technology. The case of asymmetric
regions can be seen as a stylized model of the transfer of technology from developed
countries to developing countries and where the technology transfer results in a decrease
in the emissions to output ratio in the receiving country.
The adoption of a cleaner technology reduces the marginal cost of production (mea-
sured in terms of pollution damages) thereby giving an incentive to each country to
increase its production. We show that the increase in emissions associated with the
increase in production can outweigh the positive environmental impact of adopting a
￿ cleaner￿technology. The bene￿t of the extra consumption from the adoption of the
￿ clean￿technology can be outweighed by the loss in welfare due to the increase in pol-
lution. The positive shock of implementing a cleaner technology results in a more ￿ ag-
gressive￿and ￿ sel￿sh￿behavior of countries that exacerbates the e¢ ciency loss due to
the presence of the pollution externality. The qualitative result and intuition extends
to the case of the transfer of a ￿ clean￿technology which can result in an increase in the
pollution emissions of the receiver country and the level of the stock of pollution. Thus,
a technology transfer can result in an increase of environmental damages and a decrease
of the donor countries as well as the receivers￿welfare.
Our ￿ndings can be related to those of Long and Sorger (2006) that builds on Tornell
and Lane (1999) to consider the impact of the cost of appropriation on growth in an
economy with weak or absent property rights. Rival groups can accumulate a private
asset and a common property asset. Tornell and Lane (1999) show that an increase in
the rate of return of the common asset can exacerbate the rent seeking behavior of the
competing groups, and may end up reducing the rate of growth of the economy. They
4coined the term ￿ voracity e⁄ect￿to describe the increase in rent seeking behavior. Ploeg
(2010) considers the case where the common resource is exhaustible and investigates the
impact of the absence of property rights and competing rival groups on the Hartwick
(1977) rule for reinvesting natural resource rents. Long and Sorger (2006) introduce
a private appropriation cost, e.g. cost of money laundering or lobbying, into Tornell
and Lane (1999)￿ s model and generalize the utility function to allow agents to derive
utility from wealth as well as from consumption6. They show that an increase in the
appropriation cost reduces the growth rate of the public capital stock and thus obtain
"the striking result that high costs of money laundering are detrimental to economic
growth". In our model, it is the emissions per output ratio (which can be interpreted as
the cost of production in terms of emissions) that can be negatively related to the stock
of pollution and countries￿welfare.
We use the seminal transboundary pollution game model in Dockner and Long (1993)
and Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992). In contrast with Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) and Jorgensen
and Zaccour (2001), we have taken the ratio of emissions to output as exogenously
given. This captures situations where a cleaner technology is readily available in the
more advanced country. Our analysis thus captures the impact of a transfer of technology
only. Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) (section 8) and Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001) consider the
case where the ratio of emissions to output is endogenous and is a decreasing function
of the level of the stock of clean technology. While Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) assume
that the stock of clean technology is public knowledge, Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001)
consider the case where the stock of clean technology, also referred to as the stock of
abatement capital, is country speci￿c. Each country can invest in the abatement capital
in addition to its control of emissions7. We have opted to consider exogenously given
levels of ratios of emissions to output to focus on the cases where it is a transfer of a
technology that is readily available. The fact that a transfer of technology may have
6This feature of Long and Sorger (2006) ￿ s model make it closer to our model where countries
instantaneous objectives depend on the ￿ ow of production as well as the stock of pollution.
7Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) compare the outcome under international policy coordination and the
open loop equilibrium when there is no coordination. They show that the level of production and the
stock of clean technology are both higher under the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001) consider an asymmetric game where there exist two regions facing
a pure downstream problem. They design a transfer scheme that induces the cooperative levels of
abatement and satis￿es overall individual rationality for both regions.
5counterintuitive e⁄ects is even more striking in this simple case where the technology is
readily available and free. Our conclusions de￿nitely suggest that incentives to invest in
abatement technologies need to be reevaluated in the face of the possibility of sharing
the new technology with other countries.
The main policy recommendation that can be taken from this analysis is that develop-
ing cleaner technologies and sharing available clean technologies, cannot be a substitute
for the di¢ cult task of agreeing on emission restraints and ￿nding commitment devices
that ensure that agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the post-Kyoto Protocol,
are enforced. Facilitating the transfer of available clean technologies need to be accom-
panied with enforceable agreements to limit pollution emissions. A more rigorous pricing
of carbon will not only give the proper incentives to initiate R&D race and the technol-
ogy ￿ revolution￿necessary to control green house gas emissions, as argued, for instance,
in Barrett (2009) and Galiana and Green (2009), but it is also necessary to prevent the
implementation of the innovations from exacerbating the climate change problem.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 de￿nes the Markov perfect equilibrium of
the model that we use. We study analytically the impact of the adoption of a cleaner
technology in section 4 and o⁄er a numerical analysis based on empirical evidence of
the model parameters in section 5. Section 6 contains a discussion of the impact of a
transfer of clean technologies between asymmetric regions and section 7 o⁄ers concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
Consider n countries indexed by i = 1;::;n: Each country produces a single consumption
good, ￿i. Production generates pollution emissions.
Let "i denote country i￿ s emissions of pollution. We have:
"i = ￿i￿i (1)
where ￿i is an exogenous parameter that represents country i￿ s ratio of emissions to
output8. The implementation of a cleaner technology in country i is represented by a
fall in ￿i:
8For n = 2 and ￿1 = ￿2 = 1; our model is equivalent to Dockner and Long (1993).
6Emissions of pollution accumulate into a stock, P (t); according to the following
transition equation:
_ P (t) = ￿
n
i=1"i (t) ￿ kP (t) (2)
with
P (0) = P0 (3)
where k > 0 represents the rate at which the stock of pollution decays naturally.
For notational convenience, the time argument, t; is generally omitted throughout
the paper although it is understood that all variables may be time dependent.
The instantaneous net bene￿ts of country i = 1;::;n are given by
bi (￿i;P) = Ui (￿i) ￿ Di (P) (4)
with











2; s > 0. (5)
The objective of country i￿ s government is to choose a production strategy, Qi (t) (or







￿rtbi (￿i (t);P (t))dt (6)
subject to the accumulation equation (2) and the initial condition (3). The discount
rate, r; is assumed to be constant and identical for all countries. We de￿ne below a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this n-player di⁄erential game.
3 The Markov perfect equilibrium
Countries use Markovian strategies: ￿i (:) = Qi (P;:) with i = 1;::;n. The n-tuple
(Q￿
1;::;Q￿
n) is a Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium, MPNE, if for each i 2 f1;::;ng,
f￿i (t)g = fQ￿
i (P (t);t)g is an optimal control path of the problem (6) given that ￿j (:) =
Q￿
j (P;:) for j 2 f1;::;ng; j 6= i.
In the following section, we analyze the case where countries are identical, that
is ￿1 = :: = ￿n = ￿: In this case, such a game admits a unique linear equilibrium
7and a continuum of equilibria with non-linear strategies (Dockner and Long (1993)).
The linear equilibrium is globally de￿ned and, therefore, quali￿es as a Markov perfect
equilibrium. The non-linear equilibria are typically locally de￿ned, i.e. over a subset
of the state space. We focus in this analysis on the linear strategies equilibrium. Since
our contribution is to highlight an a priori unexpected outcome from the adoption of a
￿cleaner￿technology, we wish to make sure that our result is not driven by the fact that
countries are using highly ￿sophisticated￿strategies.
Proposition 1: The vector (Q;::;Q)
Q
￿
i (P) = Q(P) ￿
1
B
(A ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿P), i = 1;::;n (7)
constitutes a Markov perfect linear equilibrium and discounted net welfare is given by
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2 + (2n ￿ 1)4s￿
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B (k + r) + (2n ￿ 1)￿￿
2
￿ = ￿
(A ￿ ￿￿)(A ￿ (2n ￿ 1)￿￿)
2Br




2 > 0 (9)
is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: We use the undetermined coe¢ cient technique (see Dockner et al (2000) Chap-
ter 4) to derive the linear Markov perfect equilibrium. The details are omitted. (See
Proposition 1 of Dockner and Long (1993) for the case where ￿ = 1). ￿
We note that Qi > 0 i⁄P < ￿ P (￿) ￿ 1
￿￿ (A ￿ ￿￿): It is straightforward to show that
￿ P (￿) > PSS (￿) for all ￿ ￿ 0:
4 Adoption of a cleaner technology
We consider the case where ￿1 = :: = ￿n = ￿: The implementation of a cleaner technology
is captured by a decrease in the emissions to output ratio, ￿; and a⁄ects all countries.
Throughout this section, without loss of generality, we normalize B to 1.





















2 + (2n ￿ 1)4s￿
2:
The impact of a cleaner technology on equilibrium steady state pollution stock and
equilibrium emissions turns out to be ambiguous. More precisely:




a decrease in the emissions to output ratio results in a larger stock of pollution at the
steady state.
Proof: We now evaluate
@PSS






















Let E (P) ￿ ￿Q(P) , i.e. E (P) denotes the emissions that are associated with the
equilibrium production strategy Q(P).
Proposition 3: There exists ~ P such that
E￿ (P) ￿ (>)0 for all P ￿ (<) ~ P
Moreover ~ P < ￿ P and ~ P > 0.
Proof: See appendix.
The adoption of a cleaner technology results in a decrease of emissions in the short-
run only when the stock of pollution is below a certain level ~ P. The results of Propo-




there exists ~ P￿0 such that for P > ~ P￿0; the adoption of a clean technology results in
a higher level of emissions in the short-run. When the damage caused by the stock of
pollution is large enough, a cleaner technology results in an increase of emissions in the
short-run as well as at the steady state (when P > ~ P￿0).
9For details see the appendix.








Following the adoption of a cleaner technology each country increases its production.
The resulting increase in emissions outweighs the positive shock of a decrease in the
emissions to output ratio and can ultimately increase the stock of pollution. Proposition
2 also establishes that the adoption of a cleaner technology results in an increase of the
long-run (the steady state) level of emissions.
The welfare implications of adopting a cleaner technology is thus not straightforward
since the increase of production is associated with an increase of pollution. We show
that implementing a cleaner technology may end up reducing social welfare, (8); in each
country: Wi (P) may be an increasing function of ￿. From the optimality condition of
a best response of a single player we have from the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation
associated to a player￿ s problem
rW (P) = U (Q) ￿ D(P) + W
0 (P)(n￿Q ￿ kP)
The impact of a change in ￿ is thus
rW￿ (P) = (U
0 (Q) + n￿W
0)Q￿ + W
0
￿ (n￿Q ￿ kP) + nQW
0
From the ￿rst order conditions of the single player￿ s problem we have
U
0 (Q) + ￿W
0 = 0
10and thus
rW￿ (P) = (n ￿ 1)￿W
0Q￿ + W
0
￿ (n￿Q ￿ kP) + nQW
0
We evaluate W￿ at P = PSS (￿)
r W￿jP=PSS(￿) = (n ￿ 1)￿W
0Q￿ + nQW
0
r W￿jP=PSS(￿) = (n ￿ 1)(￿Q￿ + Q)W
0 + QW
0
r W￿jP=PSS(￿) = (n ￿ 1)E￿W
0 + QW
0
When production remains unchanged, for an in￿nitesimal decrease in ￿ there is a
decrease of emissions by Q which results in an increase of welfare since W 0 < 0. Thus
the second term of the right hand side of r W￿jP=PSS(￿) is positive and re￿ ects the positive
impact of a decrease in ￿ due the reduction of the country￿ s own emissions if production
is left unchanged. The ￿rst term of the right hand side re￿ ects the impact on a country
of the reaction of the other n ￿ 1 countries to the change in ￿. If the decrease in ￿
results in a decrease of emissions then the ￿rst term is negative and the impact of a
clean technology on welfare is unambiguously positive. However if E￿ < 0 then the sign
of W￿ is indeterminate. We show below that W￿ may well be positive. The expression
of W￿ is too cumbersome to allow a determination of the sign of W￿ for all parameter
values. In this section we show analytically, in a limit case (i.e. when the damage from
pollution is large enough), that W￿ is positive: a decrease of the emissions per output
ratio reduces welfare. In the next section, we investigate the sign of W￿ numerically using
plausible values of the parameters and show that there exist a range of realistic values
of the parameters under which W￿ is positive.
For an analytical analysis of the sign of W￿jP=PSS(￿) rewrite





































































(￿ ￿ 2k ￿ r ￿ ￿￿￿) (14)
which after using the facts that
￿￿￿ =













s!1￿PSS = 2￿(n ￿ 1)A (15)














(n ￿ 1)(2n ￿ 1)
< 0
Main Proposition: For any n > 1, there exists ￿ s > 0 such that W￿jP=PSS(￿) > 0 for
all s > ￿ s:
The positive shock of a cleaner technology results in a more ￿aggressive￿or ￿voracious￿
behavior of countries that exacerbates the e¢ ciency loss due to the presence of the
pollution externality. The intuition behind this result is similar to the one behind the
￿ voracity e⁄ect￿in Tornell and Lane (1999) and Long and Sorger (2006), obtained in
the context of growth under weak or absent property rights. The main feature of the
equilibrium that drives this ￿ voracity￿e⁄ect is the fact that the non-cooperative emissions
strategies are downward sloping functions of the stock of pollution11. Unlike static
10See the appendix for details.
11This feature is related to the notion of intertemporal strategic substitutability at the steady state of
the MPNE, used in Jun and Vives (2004) which provides a taxonomy for possible strategic interactions in
continuous-time dynamic duopoly models. Unlike the duopoly games covered in Jun and Vives (2004),
in our model there is one state variable. Intertemporal strategic substitutability at the steady state of
the MPNE, corresponds to a situation where an increase in the state variable of one ￿rm decreases the
action of its rival.
12games or dynamic games where countries would choose emissions paths, when Markovian
strategies are considered to construct a Nash equilibrium, a country can still in￿ uence its
rival￿ s action path even though it is taking its rival￿ s strategy as given. When the rival￿ s
emission strategy is a downward sloping function of the stock of pollution, the action of
increasing one￿ s emissions bears an additional bene￿t: increase in one￿ s emissions would
result ceteris paribus in a larger level of the stock of pollution which would in turn
induce one￿ s rival to reduce her emissions. This possibility to in￿ uence rival￿ s emissions￿
path results in an overall more polluted world than would prevail if each country takes
the rival￿ s actions as given. The response of each country to a positive shock such as a
reduction of the emissions to output ratio can be to expand its output. In this ￿ aggressive￿
setup, the extent of the increase in output is such that the increase in pollution that
follows and the damage it creates outweigh the bene￿ts from the additional consumption.
Remark: The Main Proposition￿ s content mirrors the comparative static result in
oligopoly theory that an increase in ￿rms￿costs may end-up increasing ￿rms￿pro￿ts
(see Seade (1983) and Dixit (1986)). In our framework countries￿instantaneous payo⁄s
do not depend on each other￿ s ￿ ows of emissions directly; they are interrelated through
the damage from the stock of pollution, a stock to which they all contribute. A decrease
of the emissions per output ratio is analogous to a decrease in the damage from the
production of a unit of output. However in our context, the dynamic dimension, an
essential feature of a climate change model, brings an additional level of interaction
between players, compared to a static or repeated game, that contributes to our result.
Indeed, if one considers the simple case of two countries and where the damage arises




2sP 2), it can easily be shown that a decrease of the emissions to output ratio
is always welfare improving, for any arbitrarily large value of the damage parameter s, in
sharp contrast with the Main Proposition. One can possibly retrieve the ￿ voracity￿e⁄ect,
present in the MPNE, in a static framework using a conjectural variations approach.
Dockner (1992) considered a dynamic oligopoly in the presence of adjustment costs and
has shown that any steady state subgame-perfect equilibriumof the dynamic game can be
viewed as a conjectural variations equilibrium of a corresponding static game12. However,
12Dockner (1992) shows that, in the case of a di⁄erential game with linear demand and quadratic
costs, that the dynamic conjectures consistent with closed-loop steady state equilibria are negative,
constant and symmetric.
13the analysis of the full ￿ edged di⁄erential game allows to, ￿rst capture the intertemporal
nature of the pollution game under consideration, and second take into account the
transition dynamics when determining the impact of a decrease in the emissions per
output ratio.
5 Numerical example
We investigate the sign of W￿ numerically, using ￿ plausible￿values of the parameters
based on empirical evidence. We also present the e⁄ect of non-marginal changes in the
emissions per output parameter on equilibrium welfare.
We would like to emphasize the absence of consensus in the literature about precise
values of the parameters of the model. This is partly due to the large uncertainty
surrounding the economic repercussions of climate change. After a brief description of
the ranges within which each parameter may fall, we start by presenting the impact
of a change in the emissions per output ratio in a benchmark case and then conduct
sensitivity analysis with respect to parameter values.
The value of the discount rate is the subject of important debates: The Stern Review
uses 1.4%, Nordhaus uses 3 to 4%, others view discounting as unethical and that the rate
of discount should be nil (Heal (2009)). Most Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) (for
example, the DICE model (Nordhaus (1994)), the RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang
(1996)), the ENTICE model (Popp (2003))) could have up to 20 regions but usually
consider between 8 to 15 regions. Following Nordhaus (1994), Hoel and Karp (2001)
among others, we use the natural rate of decay k = 0:005.
The damage parameter is derived from estimates of the damage caused by a doubling
of the stock of GHG. Let x denote the percentage of world GDP lost due to a change in
temperature if the stock of pollution doubles. The value of x is undoubtedly the subject
of heated debates on the political and academic arena and is crucial to de￿ne the extent
and the pace at which climate change related policies need to be implemented. In a
recent study Tol (2009) conducts the di¢ cult task of aggregating the results of fourteen
studies on climate change￿ s economic repercussions and gives a relationship between the
increase of temperature and the damage using di⁄erent scenarios. The upper bound
of the 95 percent con￿dence interval of x is approximately 10% under the assumption
14that temperature would rise by 2.5￿C and 12.5% if the temperature increases by 3￿C.13
Based on experts opinions reported in Nordhaus (1994), Karp and Zhang (2010) use
21% as the maximum value for x. As Tol (2009) points out, most of the studies do not
give any estimation of x for changes in temperature that exceed 3￿C, do not look at
a time horizon beyond 2100 and their estimates typically ignore important non-market
impacts such as extreme climate scenarios, biodiversity loss or political violence due
to the increasing scarcity of resources induced by climate change. Taking into account
market and non-market impacts, Heal (2009) estimates that the cost could be 10% of
world income. Taking into account the risk of catastrophe, the Stern Review estimates
the 95th percentile to be 35.2% loss in global per-capita GDP by 2200. Thus, although
for example the Stern Review uses 5% as an estimate of x, it considers it as a conservative
estimate. We will use 2.5% in the benchmark case, and conduct a sensitivity analysis
with respect to x, using x = 5% and x = 10%.
We start by describing the benchmark case with n = 10, x = 0:025, k = 0:005 and
r = 0:025. We de￿ne the function
G(P;￿;￿0) =
W (P)j￿ ￿ W (P)j￿=￿0
W (P)j￿=￿0
which represents the relative change in welfare as ￿ changes from ￿0 to ￿ and the stock of
pollution is P. We plot in Figure 2, G(PSS (￿0);￿;￿0) where ￿0 is set to 0.47 kg of CO2/$
of GDP (World GDP was estimated at $ 61.1 trillion and emissions of CO2 at 28.5 billions
of metric tons) and set B = ￿
2
0 so that when ￿0 = 1 we retrieve the same speci￿cation
of the linear quadratic models of transboundary pollution where instantaneous utility
U is expressed in terms of emissions (e.g., Dockner and Long (1993), Ploeg and Zeeuw
(1992), List and Mason (2001), Hoel and Karp (2001)). We can observe that a decrease
of the emissions per output from ￿0 can result in a loss in welfare: the welfare loss
from the increase in pollution emissions outweighs the welfare gains from an increase in
consumption. Note that in Figure 2, W (P)j￿=￿0 < 0 and therefore when G(P;￿;￿0) > 0
we have W (P)j￿ ￿ W (P)j￿=￿0 < 0.
13In Nordhaus (1994) the 95 percent con￿dence interval of x is (￿30:0;0) under the assumption that
temperature rises by 3￿C.






x = 10 %
x = 5%
The benchmark case represents a relatively optimistic scenario in terms of the damage
of pollution. The sensitivity analysis that follows demonstrates that the consideration of
less optimistic parameter values strengthens the ￿ voracity￿e⁄ect that follows a reduction
in the emissions per output ratio.
The emissions per output ratio has to decrease below ~ ￿0 = 0:11 (i.e., a decrease of
76:28%) for the decrease to be welfare enhancing. The threshold ~ ￿0 falls to 0:0699 (i.e.,
a decrease of 85:1%) when we use x = 5% and to 0:0455 (i.e., a decrease of 90:3%) when
x = 10%.
We plot W￿jP=PSS(￿0=0:47) as a function of x.
16Figure 3: Wq|P = P (q = 0.47) as a function of x
x 0






For the benchmark case, for all x > 0:42% we have W￿jP=PSS(￿0=0:47) < 0. A marginal
decrease in emissions per out ratio reduces welfare. The relationship of W￿jP=PSS(￿0=0:47)
with respect to x (which is a proxy for s) mirrors the result obtained analytically for
the behavior of W￿jP=PSS(￿) in the limit case where s ! 1. The larger the damage
parameter the more likely a decrease of the emissions per output ratio will be welfare
reducing.
Figure 4 gives that the graph of W￿jP=Z￿PSS(￿0=0:47) is a strictly increasing function
of Z, where Z is parameter that sets the initial level of the stock pollution relative to
the steady state stock pollution.
17Figure 4: W q|P = Z * P (q = 0.47) as a function of Z
Z 0









Figure 4 shows that W￿jP=Z￿PSS(￿0=0:47) is positive for Z > ~ Z = 0:49: The larger the
stock of pollution at which we introduce a cleaner technology the more likely this will
result in a welfare loss. The value of ~ Z decreases to 0:38 when x = 5% and to 0:29 when
x = 10%.
Similarly, one can shown that W￿jP=PSS(￿0=0:47) is a strictly decreasing function of
k and is positive for k < ~ k = 0:014: The smaller the rate of decay the more likely the
implementation of a clean technology can reduce all players welfare. The threshold ~ k
increases to 0:019 when x = 5% and to 0:027 when x = 10%.
These results represent rather pessimistic conclusions about the ability of technology
to alleviate the tragedy of the commons, since it is when the damage is important and/or
the stock of pollution is large enough, and nature is least able to absorb pollution, that
a decrease of the emissions per output ratio is mitigated by the increase in pollution
emissions of each player to the point where welfare diminishes.
Moreover, it can be shown that W￿jP=PSS(￿0=0:47) is a strictly decreasing function of
r and is positive for r < 0:252: It is when players are the most patient that a clean
technology can reduce all players welfare. This is a rather surprising result which may
appear to con￿ ict with the intuition gained from the folk theorem. From the folk the-
18orem, in a repeated game, the larger the discount rate the less possible it is to sustain
cooperation. Here players are not using trigger strategies to sustain cooperation, only
the non-cooperative scenario is analyzed. Moreover the impact of r is on the change on
welfare due to a change in ￿ and not welfare itself.
This numerical example has demonstrated that the ￿ voracity￿e⁄ect is not a mere
theoretical possibility. It is shown to be strong for a signi￿cant and empirically relevant
range of parameters. It is when the damage is relatively large and/or the initial stock of
pollution are relatively large and when the natural rate of decay of pollution is relatively
￿ small￿ , i.e. precisely the situations where the tragedy of the commons is at its worse,
that the ￿ voracity￿e⁄ect prevails.
6 Transfer of clean technologies
Consider now the case of an asymmetric pollution game where countries di⁄er with
respect to their emissions per output ratios: we no longer assume that ￿i = ￿j for
i;j = 1;::;n. The analysis of the previous sections can be reproduced. However, since
the intuition of these results obtained in the sections above carry over to this case, we
refrain from doing so and just give the description of the results.
For simplicity consider the case of two groups of countries: ￿i = ￿l with i = 1;::nC
and ￿i = ￿h > ￿l with i = nC + 1;::;n. Countries are identical in all respects except for
the emissions per output ratios. Clearly if
nC
n is small enough then, any transfer of clean
technologies from the group of clean countries to the group of dirty countries, captured
by a decrease in ￿h can lead to an increase of the dirty countries￿emissions and a smaller
welfare worldwide.
This possibility can also be shown to arise by considering the limit case where:
￿l = 0. In that case the group of clean countries cannot condition their action on the
stock of pollution even though they are impacted by it. Each clean country chooses to
produce at a rate A: The objective of each of a ￿ dirty￿country￿ s government is to choose a
production strategy, Qi (t) (or equivalently a pollution control strategy), that maximizes
the discounted stream of net bene￿ts from consumption subject to the accumulation
equation
_ P (t) = ￿
n
i=nC+1"i (t) ￿ kP (t) (16)
and the initial condition (3).
19Clearly if technology were fully transferable we would have a decrease of the dirty
countries￿emissions per output ratio from ￿h to 0 and therefore a transfer of technology
results in a decrease of emissions and an increase in all countries￿welfare. However,
technologies are typically only partially transferable and the case ￿l = 0 is considered
here only for an illustration.
Even though this is an asymmetric di⁄erential game, it is still analytically tractable
and one can follow identical steps used in the sections above to show that a decrease
in ￿h may result in an increase in emissions of pollution, therefore reducing the clean
countries￿welfare. Moreover, if the increase in emissions is large enough, this may result
in all countries￿welfare diminishing following a ￿ partial￿transfer of clean technologies to
the dirty countries.
7 Concluding Remarks
Given the unsuccessful attempts of multilateral e⁄orts to control emissions and slow
down the human contribution to climate change, the development and use of cleaner
technologies is often invoked as the way out of the ￿ brink￿ . This paper shows that the
failure of coordination over emissions may prevent the international community from
ripping any bene￿t from the creation and adoption of a cleaner technology and may
even result in exacerbating the tragedy of the commons.
The decrease of the emissions per output ratio has two components, the direct ef-
fect which is a decrease of emissions if the quantity produced by each player remains
unchanged and the indirect e⁄ect since quantity produced changes and so do the emis-
sions. Emissions may increase following the adoption of a cleaner technology, and the
resulting increase in pollution damages can be substantial enough to annihilate the pos-
itive impact of the direct e⁄ect on welfare. We have shown that this may arise for a
wide range of ￿ realistic￿values of the parameters of the model. Moreover, the possibility
that emissions per output ratio and world emissions can evolve in opposite directions is
supported by recent anecdotal evidence. While the world￿ s emissions per output ratio
decreased from 0.54 (kilograms of CO2 per 1$ of GDP (PPP)) in 1990, to 0.50 in 2000
and 0.47 in 2007, world￿ s emissions of CO2 increased from 21,899 millions of metric tons
in 1990 to 24,043 in 2000 and 29,595 in 2007 (see The Millennium Development Goals
Report 2010 (United Nations)).
20Our results extend to the case of an asymmetric pollution game where countries di⁄er
with respect to their emissions per output ratios: a transfer of clean technologies from
￿ clean￿countries to ￿ dirty￿countries may result in a loss of welfare for the clean countries
and even a loss of welfare for all countries.
This brings into question the e⁄ectiveness of the World Bank￿ s Clean Technology
Fund to which developed countries have pledged over 6 billion dollars and proposed leg-
islation such as the IMPACT Act 2009 in the US and other policy measures that are cur-
rently being pursued by countries to develop and spread clean technologies. Our analysis
shows that it may only be possible to reap the bene￿ts arising from such measures if
the implementation of clean technologies is accompanied with enforceable agreements to
limit pollution emissions.
The results of this paper should not be interpreted as supporting the use of dirtier
of technologies. The main policy recommendation is that the e⁄orts of discovering and
using clean technologies should not be viewed as a substitute for the need to succeed
in a multilateral coordination of emissions. Similarly, the potential negative e⁄ects on
welfare of transfers of clean technologies should be interpreted as a recommendation to
accompany technology transfers with agreements over limitations on emissions of the
receiving country.
The e⁄ort of creating and transferring clean technologies and the e⁄ort of coordinat-
ing the control over emissions should be pursued jointly. Intuition would suggest that
the potential negative impact of clean technologies would not take place if the adoption
of a clean technology were accompanied with a well designed limit over emissions. Al-
though this is intuitive, this idea deserves to be carefully studied as the impact of quotas
in dynamic games are far from trivial (see, e.g., Dockner and Haug (1990 and 1991)).
Barrett (2009) and Galiana and Green (2009), among others, argue that a substantial
and comprehensive change in technology is required to stabilize atmospheric concentra-
tions and that market incentives are insu¢ cient to induce the necessary technological
change. Barrett (2009) concludes that ￿ international cooperation is needed to set a car-
bon penalty, to increase R&D spending,...￿ . Our analysis shows that the international
cooperation over a carbon penalty or emissions control is not only needed as an incen-
tive to induce R&D and innovation, it is necessary to ensure that the development of
cleaner technologies does not exacerbate the free riding behavior that is at the origin of
the climate change problem. We have considered the impact of an exogenous change in
21the emissions per output ratio. The results of this paper suggest that the analysis of a
model that embeds this framework and where investment in R&D to reduce emissions
per output is taken into account, can be a promising line of future research.
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23Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: There exists ~ P such that
E￿ (P) ￿ (>)0 for all P ￿ (<) ~ P




















Using the fact that
￿￿￿ =









































E￿ (P) < 0
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￿ = ~ P < P:















A > 0 (17)
thus showing that ~ P > 0.
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After simpli￿cation and substitution of E￿ (0) we have
(2n ￿ 1)E￿ (0)
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The equilibrium production strategy is
Q = A ￿
An￿￿
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￿ ￿ 2k ￿ r
2(2n ￿ 1)
.
Substitute into the equilibrium production strategy
Q = A ￿
An￿￿2k￿r
2(2n￿1)
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which after simpli￿cation gives (10).
Derivation of (11)




















which after simpli￿cation yields
A
￿




















































Using the facts that
￿￿￿ =







































￿2 ￿ (2k + r)
2
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as the fraction of the two monomials of degree 3 in the numerator and the denominator
respectively, which gives (11).
Derivation of (15)
The steady state is given by
A
￿










which can be rewritten as
A
￿



































s!1￿P = 2A(n ￿ 1)￿:
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